Farmland matching and intermediary land banks
A trusted go-between connects retiring or absent landowners with new and expanding farmers and brokers secure leases, joint ventures or transfers, so land stays farmed.
Start small
In one district, recruit a trusted local person (retired adviser, co-op staff, land trust volunteer) for about 1 day a week for 6 months. Keep a simple register of owners stepping back and new-entrant seekers (a spreadsheet and short form). Hold one evening succession and land-access workshop with an accountant or solicitor (a few hundred in venue and refreshments). Use Scotland's free information pack and Land For Good-style lease templates, and aim for 1 to 2 facilitated introductions before formalising a service.
The problem
New and next-generation farmers can't get secure farmland, while older owners hold land they no longer farm, often with no successor, leaving fields idle or abandoned and holdings fragmented.
Where it fits
Thrives where many farmers are ageing without successors and land sits idle, but owners are reluctant to sell or lease to strangers. The intermediary must be trusted: a public institution (Japan's prefectural Farmland Intermediary Management Institutions, from 2014) or a respected independent facilitator (Scottish Land Matching Service, Land For Good in the US). Needs free or cheap advice for both sides, standard lease and joint-venture templates, succession coaching and strong local farmland governance.
The principle underneath
Owners hold back land mostly out of distrust, uncertainty and the effort of a transfer, not price. A neutral go-between who handles paperwork, de-risks the relationship and offers flexible arrangements (leases, joint ventures, staged succession) unlocks land that would never reach the open market. Supporting land seekers and coaching older farmers on succession works both sides of the match.
Who to call
Scottish Land Matching Service (manager Ian Davidson) · Scottish Land Commission · Land For Good (New England) · Japan's prefectural Farmland Intermediary Management Institutions (農地中間管理機構) and MAFF · Hanno Jentzsch, University of Vienna · Xiaoxi Gao, Nobuyoshi Yasunaga, Norikazu Inoue (Japan farmland bank research)
Watch out for
Land offers are scarce compared with seekers. Short or insecure leases stop new entrants investing. Owners fear losing control. Land can drift to large incumbents or corporations instead of new entrants. Success measured in people 'reached' rather than secure tenancies. Short grant funding. Matches fail without follow-up support, and poor or isolated plots stay idle even when brokered.
Where it comes from
Rooted in long-standing tenancy and share-farming traditions. Formalised as public farmland banks in Japan in 2014; developed as NGO farm-link and succession services in New England (Land For Good, founded 2004); Scotland's service grew from the government-convened Farming Opportunities for New Entrants group. Templates and guidance are public; credit the originating services when adapting them.
Where it's worked
Japan (prefectural Farmland Intermediary Management Institutions) · Established 2014 · analysis published 2023
Subleasing through the institutions increased farmland held by core farmers, and corporatised community farming organisations increased subleasing, but did not measurably curb abandoned farmland (Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science 7(4)).
Peer reviewedSource
Hikawa Town, Shimane Prefecture, Japan · Published 2017
Strong local control over farmland made consolidation through the farmland bank possible, largely in ways that protected incumbent interests (Jentzsch, Contemporary Japan 29(1)).
Peer reviewedSource
Scotland (Scottish Land Matching Service) · First year, reported October 2020
152 enquiries and 4 successful matches including a joint venture and a partnership agreement; about four times as many seekers as land offers.
DocumentedSource
New England, USA (Land For Good, Land Access Project Phase 2) · September 2015 to August 2018
Over 2,060 beginning farmers improved land access or tenure and at least 67 secured land; 732 senior farmers attended succession workshops and 25 planned transfers to a beginning farmer.
DocumentedSource
Where it failed
Japan: prefectural data show subleasing through the institutions helped move land to core farmers but did not measurably slow the growth of abandoned farmland (Gao, Yasunaga & Inoue 2023), and a local study found consolidation depended on strong local control that could protect incumbent interests (Jentzsch 2017). Scotland: the Land Matching Service's first year had 152 enquiries but only 4 matches, with about four times as many seekers as land offers. New England: Land For Good's 2015 to 2018 project reached thousands, but at least 67 beginning farmers secured land. Matching is slow and land supply is the bottleneck.
Related Fruit
- TreeCommunity-owned farmland trust with long leasesCitizens pool money to buy farmland, take it off the speculative market for good, and lease it on long, affordable terms to new ecological farmers.
- TreeFarm incubatorGives new farmers a few years on shared land, tools and mentoring so they can test and grow a farm business before taking on their own land.